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For the past several decades, biomedical research has principally been centered on
molecular biology and genomic science. Although many molecular pathways and
players in different disease and normal biological processes have been elucidated
over this period, the much hoped-for ‘‘true’’ understanding of cellular and organismic
functions has arguably not been achieved. Furthermore, current mainstream research
paradigms from neurodegenerative disease to oncology to evo-devo research do not
signal a clear path forward as to how that desired ‘‘true’’ understanding could be
achieved. Here three questions can be raised: Why are we where we are in biology?
What is the level and type of understanding that should and can be reached? And how
do we get there? Denis Noble’s recent book makes illuminating contributions to
answering these questions, providing a thoughtful analysis of the historical and
contextual basis of the current state of biological research.
Noble is a noted cardiovascular physiologist with interests in mathematical and
systems biology. He taught at Oxford for 41 years and has been an Emeritus
Professor since 2004. In Dance to the Tune of Life, he details how his undergraduate
and graduate education at University College London from 1955 to 1961 not only
allowed him to study and excel in physiology, but also led him to voluntarily
explore physics, mathematics, philosophy and computer science, a background that
allows for a unique perspective to be brought to biomedical research. It is this
perspective that has enabled the book’s nine chapters and detailed endnotes to have
elements of physiology, history and philosophy of science, and philosophy itself, all
combined in one place. It is therefore a very informative read.
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Beginning with a history of Copernican, Galilean and Newtonian science,
Noble’s main focus is a critique of Neo-Darwinism and gene-centric views of
biology propagated in the past century. He writes that ‘‘twentieth-century scientists
ridiculed the great French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and sidelined almost
completely the brilliant developmental biologist and polymath Conrad Wadding-
ton’’ and that ‘‘unnecessary dogmatism has unfortunately haunted evolutionary
biology.’’ He identifies with the molecular biologist Max Perutz who thought of
DNA as the ‘‘score of life’’ rather than the ‘‘secret of life’’ and reminds us of
cytogeneticist Barbara McClintock’s prescient statement that the genome is ‘‘a
highly sensitive organ of the cell’’ (McClintock 1984). Reiterating this point in a
commentary written with other colleagues in 2016, Noble writes:
The fashion was that all would be revealed once we had read the ‘book of life,’
the complete human genome. It took a mere decade of the present century for
it to become clear that the ‘book’ is an almost illegible ‘database’ rather than a
readable ‘program of life’ that would automatically lead to advances in
physiology and medicine (Noble et al. 2016).
I think given the multitude of evidence currently available, most scientists, even those
who previously supported an entirely gene-centric view of biology, would support this
diagnosis. Moreover, it is unfortunate that the field had to go through a circular path to
reach a conclusion that might have appeared obvious from the outset, a conclusion set
forth, for example, beginning with the work of Waddington. Nevertheless, given where
we are now, the question is where we go from here, and how we retool our methods to
reach a more thorough understanding of the workings of the cell. To that end, in
Chapter 6, Noble formulates a theory of ‘‘Biological Relativity,’’ which proposes that no
privileged level of causation exists in biology, and to understand the whole one must
adopt an integrative approach with an emphasis on ‘‘multi-level interactions’’ in the
organism. The theory espouses the position that biological phenomena in an organism
are parts of an open system and that we should be against ‘‘unwarranted explanatory
reductionism.’’ As an example, Noble states that ‘‘spiral arrhythmia’’ in the heart appears
random at the cellular level, but is ordered at the level of the whole organ. Therefore,
even a seemingly ‘‘uncomplicated’’ arrhythmia cannot be reduced to its encompassing
parts. Noble has since further underscored the need for a new theoretical framework that
could guide biomedical research beyond what has already been achieved:
What is needed is a framework of theory within which we can see our way
through the forest of data to find the clues to understanding complexity. I see
philosophy as playing a major role here since what is required is a mind-shift
away from the naı¨ve reductionist paradigm that dominated twentieth century
biology. We need reductionist science. But we don’t need the naı¨ve and
exclusive philosophy that often accompanies it. Reduction and integration in
biology go together, rather as they do also in the mathematics of calculus.
(Noble 2017b)
When we as readers consider Biological Relativity as one such framework of
theory, certain ambiguities and questions might arise that warrant further
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consideration and could perhaps be addressed in future work. To begin with, if
genes are always ‘‘passive, not active, causes,’’ how would we account for
monogenic diseases with a very clear cause-and-effect relationship to the
phenotype? This causal structure could also manifest itself not at the level of
genes, but at the level of proteins, for example in human amyloid diseases (Wang
et al. 2017) or heritable yeast prions (Newby and Lindquist 2013), to name a few.
Furthermore, if there is no ‘‘privileged scale,’’ how can there be any structure in
biology, and anything beyond ameboid organisms? Hierarchies and ‘‘privileged
scales,’’ if I understand the latter phrase correctly, abound in biology, from embryo
development all the way to the language faculty. In this context, Noble quotes from
the philosopher Nicholas of Cusa that ‘‘the world will have its centre everywhere
and circumference nowhere.’’ But, analogously, can we say that the cell has its
nucleus everywhere and plasma membrane nowhere? A cell’s nucleus and plasma
membrane are not mere conventions and metaphors. This is not to say that
everything inside the cell is orchestrated in the nucleus, but rather that every
biological structure has an inherent nonrelativistic framework. Moving beyond the
cell and to the level of the organism, does relativism hold at that larger scale? I think
the answer is still unclear even there. For example, if we consider the language
faculty [‘‘I-language’’ (Chomsky 2006) to be precise], what arguably makes us
human (Berwick and Chomsky 2015), can we say that our inherent language faculty
is part of an open system, one that ‘‘dance[s] to the tune of the organism and its
social context?’’
Furthermore, there is always room for pause when concepts and ideas from
physics are applied to biology, which is many orders removed from the physical
sciences and where scientific reasoning and explanations cannot be as exact. For
example, describing ‘‘stochasticity’’ and randomness in a recent article, Noble
writes:
Stochasticity is harnessed by organisms to generate functionality. Randomness
does not, therefore, necessarily imply lack of function or ‘blind chance’ at
higher levels. In this respect, biology must resemble physics in generating
order from disorder (Noble 2017a).
As concepts, ‘‘generating order from disorder,’’ are valuable guideposts in framing
our perspective toward biological questions, how can they be applied to formulating
an inherently testable hypothesis? Many ‘‘laws’’ of physics do not even completely
and accurately describe and predict atomic-scale physical phenomena. So how can
biological phenomena be reasonably explained by them? This is not to suggest that
concepts from physics have no use in biology. For example, I found two ideas about
randomness and the ascribing of functions particularly interesting in the book. As
for randomness, Noble suggests an alternative definition of ‘‘random with respect to
what?’’ framework. And as for functionality, he writes: ‘‘It is an important
consequence of the theory of Biological Relativity that we should ascribe functions
and purposes to the level at which they make sense, which is the level at which they
constrain the interactions of the system at lower levels.’’
Another reservation with Biological Relativity, a theory that may be categorized
as a branch of systems biology, is whether it can really simplify our understanding
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of cellular phenomena and contribute to science’s ultimate goal of simplifying
complexity. Research programs exist in the physical sciences that focus on complex
adaptive systems, perhaps best epitomized by the work of the Santa Fe Institute in
New Mexico founded in 1984. ‘‘Complexity science’’ in general utilizes mathe-
matical modeling to tackle topics such as emergence, chaos theory and complex
networks, among other topics. It remains to be seen if these lines of research can
really simplify the cloud of uncertainty and noise that separates us from a true
understanding of the workings of a biological cell, even before we get to the level of
the organism.
To gain deeper insights into cellular functions, perhaps a good working plan
could be to go back to serious and elementary rational inquiry, starting with the low-
hanging fruit(s), in any discipline that we choose to study. If we decide to study the
behavior of a collection of cells in an organ, one could start by looking at the
systems dynamics of the interacting proteins in each cell or deciphering the
transcriptional and epigenetic network behind those protein interactions. But how
can we arrive at a serious understanding of these cellular events if we are still
unclear about the structural elements and ‘‘disordered’’ regions of each single
protein, or what really constitutes an ‘‘interaction’’ between two proteins? These
questions are not meant to imply that we are aiming to reduce cellular functions to
structural elements at a single protein level, but they do suggest that rational inquiry
should proceed in a hierarchical fashion. Biology cannot reasonably be reduced to
chemistry and physics, but should eventually be unified with them, and we cannot
get there before seriously pursuing the basic and seemingly pedantic questions that
are still unanswered in biology.
Noble’s Dance to the Tune of Life is an illuminating account of why philosophy
is necessary in doing science. Philosophy was always part and parcel of science and
it must remain so if we are to achieve science’s enduring goal of simplifying our
understanding of the world around us. Following with this theme, Noble writes:
[Immanuel Kant] showed that we always need a framework within which to
interpret the world, but that the framework itself may not be derivable from
what we already know. That is why all science requires a metaphysics if it is
not to be mere cataloguing. That metaphysics may not be derivable from
purely empirical observations.
The quest for that ideal framework continues.
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